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The Nature of the Law and the Role of Citizenship
Remarks of Robert John Araujo, S.J.*
First of all, I want to thank you for being here tonight to join with me
in thinking about something that has been important to me for almost
half a century (and I am sure to most of you)—the law. One
fundamental question about the law concerns a core issue: what is its
essence? In short, what is it about? By tackling in this brief hour this
subject, I am hopeful that these thoughts will spur your own reflections
on the law and why it is vital to us and to our society. The points I shall
make to you may be placed into two complementary categories: the first
deals with the essence of the law itself, i.e., what is it that makes the law
the law; the second concern deals with the role of the citizen—as lawmaker, administrator, judge, other official, or voter—in defining what
the law is and what its content should be. At the outset, these two
groups are inextricably related to the vitality of our republican
democracy.
From my perspective, I know that these two interrelated topics
* John Courtney Murray, S.J. University Professor, Loyola University Chicago. A.B.,
Georgetown University; M.Div., S.T.L., Weston School of Theology; Ph.B., St. Michael’s
Institute; B.C.L., Oxford University; J.D., Georgetown University; LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia
University. Upon completing military service as an officer in the United States Army, Father
Araujo served as a trial attorney and attorney advisor in the Solicitor’s Office of the United States
Department of the Interior (1974–1979). In 1979, he joined the Law Department of the Standard
Oil Company (Ohio) and served in a variety of capacities until 1985. After corporate service, he
joined the general corporate department of a New England law firm and remained there until
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deserve a treatment far more profound than can be offered in today’s
presentation. But in this hour, I hope to specify and briefly develop
several elements that are needed for the task of responsibly addressing
the two categories which I have just identified. Let me begin by
tackling the law’s essence. What is it? How do we begin?
I.
From an historic perspective we can think of some of the earliest
legal systems that dealt with the regulation of human conduct from the
ancient Jewish law that derived from the Mosaic law; the law of
Hammurabi; the legal systems of ancient Greece and Rome; and, the
law of the Church. As we think of these ancient systems of codified
principles and how they were applied to the lives of those who lived in
the legal systems supported by these laws, we should see that there is
something common that underpins each of them. What is this common
denominator? As a teacher of the law and as a former practitioner of the
law, I have been working on an understanding of this theme for some
time. As a result of my ongoing reflection, I have concluded that there
is a purpose or an objective that appears to be at the heart of the matter
of why we have law and the juridical institutions that participate in its
existence. While I agree with Professor Michael Olivas that we
teachers of the law are also “in want of a purpose,”1 much of what he
said when addressing the topic dealt with the preservation of the
profession of teaching the law. While I have some sympathy with this
enterprise, I must also be candid and assert that there is something
more, there has to be something more to the teaching of the law because
there is something more to the law than the preservation of the
profession that teaches it and the profession which practices it.
And what the “it” is is the subject of this lecture. Regardless of who
we are as individuals, each of us has a sense of the law and what it is
about. For those who have businesses that are regulated by the state and
its legal institutions, their livelihoods are intersected by the law. For
those who earn income, their revenue is regulated by the law. For most
who want to do something in the public square—from speech, to
publication, to operating a motor vehicle—their lives and the law are
inseparable. But if the law is seemingly inescapable from human
existence, what can be said about its essence, its nature? Does it have
something to do with logic, or to borrow from the famous line of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, does it have something to do with experience rather
1. Michael A. Olivas, Ask Not For Whom the Law School Bell Tolls, 41 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 101, 101 (2013).
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than logic?2 In an important way, it deals with both. Allow me to
explain my position.
Since the beginning of human history, the making and application of
law has been a part of civilization. Typically as we think about the
history of the law—law designed to protect the citizenry and the
society—we see two things that precede the law’s drafting and
promulgation. The first item is, when all of the jokes about law are put
aside (for example, the line misattributed to Bismarck that laws are like
sausage, it is better not to see them being made),3 we ascertain that the
law begins with the activity of human intelligence. In candor, while
each of us may have differing opinions about the merits of what the
thinker is thinking and what is the measure of intelligence behind the
thinking, we need to acknowledge that the human intellect is at work as
laws are formulated. The second element follows, but it is trickier to
evaluate: this human intelligence has the capacity to comprehend the
intelligible world or universe that surrounds us. But what does the
intelligence comprehend, and how is the object of the comprehension
being registered? For the time being, we can see that there is something
about the law that makes it a synthesis of this intelligence
comprehending the intelligible reality: the human mind acknowledges
the need for authoritative normative direction that responds to some
matter of concern to society. This is what is or should be at the heart of
the law-making enterprise. But we are still not at the essence or nature
of the law itself. More work is in order.
Of course, we should recognize that the measure of intelligence and
its effectiveness in comprehending what is needed by the way of law to
respond to the needs of society is not always the same for everyone.
Something is still missing as we consider the possibility that some laws
which are the product of a great deal of thought have problematic if not
evil consequences. For example, we may recall the Fugitive Slave Law
or the Nuremburg Laws.4 There is no doubt that much thought went

2. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881)
(“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”).
3. See Peter L. Strauss, The Courts & The Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political
History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 265 n.92 (1998) (noting that regardless of whether Bismarck
made this statement, many agree to its message).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (including the return of escaped slaves as a component of
entitling citizens of each state to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states);
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864) (mandating that states return
escaped slaves and imposing criminal sanctions for individuals who helped slaves escape); INGO
MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 96–111 (Deborah L. Schneider
trans., 1991) (describing the theoretical underpinnings for and the process of creating the
Nuremberg Laws).
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into their design. As we think about such problematic or evil laws, we
can identify the need for the law-making process to take account of the
moral implications of the law that will be produced. Human
intelligence and its perception of the moral concerns of society are
essential to the law-making enterprise and to the law itself. The same
human intelligence, which has a crucial role in the making and
interpretation of the law, has the capacity to recognize that the law is
more than just a way of making and applying laws—norms—to many
aspects of human existence. It is more than a system of achieving
certain political results. It is a system that is integral to human society,
which often goes by the name of the rule of law and is dedicated to
achieving the common good. We know the rule of law as the norms and
the system of governance including the making, interpretation, and
application of the norms by which we live in civil society. But the
theme of today’s presentation is to obtain a better understanding of what
is the law itself, that is, its nature/essence. Hence, there is need to take
into consideration its moral dimension. After all, the result and impact
of the law will tell us a great deal about its nature.
This issue raises the question that has intrigued the members of the
human family since ancient times: this issue is the quiddity, or the
“whatness” of the law. In a more contemporary way, we can think of
quiddity (whatness) as addressed by a series of questions such as: what
is the law about; what is it supposed to do; and why do we need it?
In offering an initial response to these and related questions, we
might think of Thomas Aquinas’s first principle of the law which takes
into consideration moral concerns: do that which is good and avoid that
which is evil.5 The Swiss Jesuit theologian Viktor Cathrein (1845–
1931) offered a similar insight when he stated that the law is “the light
of reason inherent in us by nature, through which we perceive what we
ought to do and avoid.”6 Saint Paul of Tarsus presented another useful
formulation by acknowledging that the fundamental quality of the law is
that which God has inscribed on our hearts.7 In relying on the work of
John Courtney Murray, my take about what is at the heart of the making
of norms, which are the laws for society, is this: the law is premised on
the two assumptions that I have already mentioned, viz., (1) the human
person is intelligent, and (2) human intelligence is capable of
5. 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, at pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 2 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1952), reprinted in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 1, 221–22 (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds, 1952).
6. HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 181–82 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1949)
[hereinafter ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW].
7. Romans 2:15.
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comprehending intelligible reality so that the governance of society by
the rule of law proceeds in a rational, moral, and just fashion.8 And
now I have added a third area for consideration: the moral factor or
dimension.
It is necessary to evaluate what I have presented so far. Knowing that
I have begun, but not completed a process of explaining the nature of
the law, we must consider whether the essence of the law is a command;
is it a suggestion; is it a grant of something to someone; or, is it
something else? Is it an obligation, duty, or responsibility? Is it a right
to be claimed by one and satisfied by another? Is it the mechanism for
attaining whatever is good and avoiding whatever is evil?
One way of sorting out answers to these questions is by returning to
the emphasis I just placed on the synthesis of the intellect
comprehending the intelligible reality given the context of the common
good and the accompanying moral evaluation. We probably agree that
the human person is an intelligent creature. Notwithstanding different
measures of how this intelligence is distributed and exercised, we
probably also agree that each person is gifted with a degree of reason.
Notwithstanding the subjectivity that can compromise human reason, it
also remains within the capacity of the human person to think and
comprehend beyond one’s self to understand the subject matter that is
the focus of the reason in an objective manner. In short, what I am
suggesting here is that the individual person has the capacity in
reasoning to understand the matter from the perspectives of others as
well as the perspective of one’s self. This is the fundamental aspect of
the moral question—the distinction between good and evil—to which I
have alluded. Moreover, this is the basis for contending that the human
person is intelligent and has the capacity for thinking and acting
objectively, i.e., beyond self-interest, in order to achieve what is good
and right and to avoid what is not.
With this objective intelligence at work, the human mind has the
aptitude to comprehend the events and needs of the world that
necessitate the making and application of norms that promote human
flourishing and the common good. By the common good, I mean this: it
is the achieving and preservation of the good for the individual and the
good for of all members of the same society. The good for anyone
cannot be considered without simultaneously considering the good for
8. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 109 (1960) (describing the presupposition of the doctrine of
natural law as: “[T]hat man is intelligent; that reality is intelligible; and that reality, as grasped by
intelligence, imposes on the will the obligation that it be obeyed in its demands for action or
abstention”).

ON THE
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others. The norms necessary for advancing the common good are the
basis of the positive human law that are essential to any society so that
the common good may always be the objective of the law. Why? The
answer is uncomplicated: the law serves all rather than some members
of society. Certainly there are corruptions of legal systems where the
common good is not the goal of the law, its making, or its application
and adjudication. But objective intelligence sways the law-maker from
this tragic result which is contrary to the law’s nature.
An illustration of a corrupt legal system is the totalitarian state whose
values are typically characterized by furthering the interests of the
ruling party rather than the common good.9 It is emblematic that in the
totalitarian legal system the will (the desire) outstrips or outpaces the
crucial role of the unbiased intellect as I have described it. Although
the will is a vital part of human nature (most people have goals and
desires), it must nonetheless be tempered by the intellect, which is
guided by objective reason. If it is not, the will can generate an appetite
that is destructive to the person whose will is the directing force and to
those who are affected by this will’s exercise.
A will that is guided by the discerning and objective intellect is
needed to direct both the person and society toward goals that are both
useful and essential to achieving the common good. By way of
example, the Preamble of the United States Constitution offers a critical
perspective into the will desiring the common good by asserting as
objectives: the forming a more perfect union, the establishing justice,
the insuring domestic tranquility, the providing for the common
defense, the promoting the general welfare, and the securing the
blessings of generations for the existing as well as future generations.10
These aspirations are attainable when the law that is the product of the
Constitution is guided by objective reason. I hasten to add here that the
Preamble to the basic law of the United States reflects inspiring
objectives that are applicable beyond the shores of the land where this
law was intended to apply.
But now we must contend with the question, where does the objective
reason come into play? We begin by looking at something foundational
to the Constitution, viz., the Declaration of Independence. In this
document we see objective reason in operation. Its foundation is a

9. See J. L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY 43–49 (1970) (noting
how members of the controlling party that “claim to know and to represent the real and ultimate
will of the nation . . . [have] a blank [check] to act on behalf of the people, without reference to
the people’s actual will”).
10. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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claim to the natural law—or as Jefferson termed it, “the Laws of Nature
and of Nature’s God”—which present truths about the human person
and human society that are self-evident.11 This is objective reason
contemplating the common good. Moreover, this is the nucleus of the
nature of law! Through the use of objective reason, the door to truth
will open, thereby making that which is self-evident accessible to those
who exercise objective reason. But how does the person seeking
objective reason find it? Is it something attained in law school or the
elite universities? Well, it is attainable by anyone who cultivates
fidelity to the cardinal virtues, for they direct the human person toward
the life that is concerned about the common good.
It is through the exercise and application of the cardinal virtues
(prudence/wisdom, temperance/forbearance, courage, and justice) that
the human person tempers the will through objective reason. In short,
these virtues prevent the person and the societies of persons from
seeking objectives that are contrary to the natural law and its practical
objective, the common good. These virtues are ingrained in many
people; moreover, they are essential to human societies and their
success in caring for their members. Additionally, these virtues
exercise an important role in the formulation of law, which will be used
to guide and regulate the society in the endeavors directed toward
achieving the common good. As the virtues build the character of the
human person, the persons thus affected will be much more inclined to
consider not only self-interest but also the interests of one’s fellow
human beings. The virtues prepare the human person to be both good
citizen and good neighbor who sees the society in which he or she lives
as the place where the common good can become a reality. This is why
the Declaration of Independence asserts that prudence is the mechanism
to regulate inclinations; however, the human will—the desire—can
often be strong but is not tethered to the objective reason of prudence
and wisdom.12 It is this objective reason that is the key to preventing
governments and their laws from becoming despotic so that “the Laws
of Nature and of Nature’s God” are not compromised. In order to avoid
this compromise, Jefferson penned that the “Supreme Judge of the
world” was the appeal to which objective reason would be made and
heard.13 By way of relevant digression, we do not hear very often such
words today.

11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
12. As the Declaration states, “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient causes.” Id.
13. Id. at para. 6.

THE NATURE OF THE LAW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

294

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/29/2013 7:45 PM

[Vol. 45

The Declaration and the Constitution recognize the importance and
the role of the law and the rule of law. In their respective fashions,
these texts disclose something about the law’s nature by considering the
purposes for which the laws generated by right and objective reason and
promulgated by the lawful human authority are ordained. One of these
goals is to restrain the will that is misled by an appetite that puts aside
objective reason. Another is to promote the common good as the
Preamble of the Constitution declares.14 Now the skeptic may conclude
that what I have just stated is not only a lofty goal, but an unrealistic
one as well. To justify this position, the skeptic may adduce that the
human person is an imperfect being living in an imperfect world that is
characterized by imperfect institutions. While the skeptic may correctly
acknowledge the existence of human imperfection, which I do not
contest, I add that the human person and human institutions can move
toward improvement, a movement directed by human intelligence and
virtuous conduct.
The foundation of this response to the skeptic is established upon the
presumption that the human person is intelligent. While everyone has
different measures of intelligence, the hallmark of the human being is
that he or she possesses and uses this aptitude. In addition, most
everyone has the capacity to distinguish between what the “is” is and
what could make the “is” better. This is the distinction between being
and oughtness made by Heinrich Rommen.15 Put simply, this is the
distinction between the “is” and the “ought.” But the distinction does
not end here because the question must be asked: how does one know
that there is something that is the “is” from something that is the
“ought”?
Understanding what something is—what it is about, if you will—is
crucial to virtually any human endeavor including the law. If I need to
make a small repair to replace a screw on my eyeglasses, I look for a
small screwdriver rather than a hammer. Upon thinking about what
needs to be done, I recall that there is a tool designed for this very
function. While I acknowledge that there are many tools that are useful
to human activities, the screwdriver, because of what it is, is the
instrument that will properly assist me. Its essence or nature is
something that I comprehend, and the tool’s essence enters the choice I
14. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“[T]o form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common [defense], promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . . .”).
15. See ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 6, at 161–62 (“[E]very attempt to establish
the natural law must start from the fundamental relation of being and oughtness, of the real and
the good.”).
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make in selecting the instrument to assist me in completing my project.
However, as I survey the other projects that I need to tackle, I might
consider whether the screwdriver of any size or type (e.g., Philips,
flathead, etc.) is the tool I need. I may reach the conclusion that the
work now facing me requires a different tool because I realize that the
screwdriver is unsuitable for the new work that is ahead of me. I
consider the other tools that are available, but I conclude, because of my
thinking about what needs to be done, that those tools in my tool chest
are unsuitable for the task. I realize that there ought to be a tool which
is suitable, and I realize that my neighbor has such a device which I
borrow. This consideration of the “is” and the “ought” enable me to
conclude the ontology of the tools that are available.
This
understanding of ontology or essence/nature, further provides the
catalyst for concluding that for some future work, I may have to develop
a new tool that is fitting to the undertaking ahead of me.
This scenario has applicability to the nature of the law. Through
critical thinking that is an element of human intelligence, I come to see
that there is an essence or nature of the things that surround human
existence. I further realize that other people have the same or similar
capacity to reach analogous conclusions. This is possible because in
these circumstances the person, regardless of who he or she is, can think
about what needs to be done and extends this thought process beyond
what is immediately within his or her thoughts. In other words, the
person goes beyond the knowledge of the personal self and thinks more
deeply and more objectively about the matter under contemplation. The
appeal of self-interest so attractive to most persons begins to diminish,
and it is objective human intelligence that enables the person to see this.
In short, the objective thought process enables the individual to reach
some truth about the essence of thing and its being and determines
whether it will satisfy the need which presents itself or if something else
must be pursued to fulfill the need.
As human intelligence has the capacity for understanding what
something is and what something is not, this intelligence possesses the
additional aptitude for determining if the object under study lacks
something essential to its nature and objective. We therefore know
what must or ought to be done in order to remedy any deficiency which
may exist. Thus, we can also make the is/ought distinction regarding
the precepts of law. If this perspective seems plausible, we have the
capacity to see what the law is and what it is not. If the law fails to
meet reasonable expectations, we may well see the course needed to
remedy this deficiency as well.
On many occasions, our rational nature may acknowledge that the
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law fulfills its objectives satisfactorily. However, there may be
occasions when we know that the law, or an element of it, is insufficient
for the task; moreover, our intelligence may demonstrate that the law as
it “is” is ill-suited for the circumstance to which it is being applied. In
this kind of circumstance, we can further recognize that the law ought to
be doing something that it is not. In other instances, we may see that it
is being expected to do something beyond its competence. The human
person has the capacity to know and accept these conclusions insofar as
the person’s nature is characterized by reason which comprehends that
there is a final cause—goal—of the law which is not only not being
achieved but also is being frustrated because of the law itself. These
points are essential to the good governance of human society.
A longstanding principle of good government and good governance
is the notion of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is the name given to the
concept that decisions—which would include the need for and the
making of new norms—should be made at the level where they will be
applied. This concept is experienced by most people in their formative
years in the context of family life where the human person first
experiences norms and law. Here we see parental intelligence
comprehending the intelligible reality of their family circumstances and
developing norms internal for the prudent regulation and direction of
family life. Immediately beyond the nuclear family, we see the same
principle at work in the village, town, or city. Once again, the
intelligence of office holder and citizen combine for discussion and
debate that generate the norms by which this local community will
conduct its interpersonal relations. In a similar fashion, albeit more
cumbersome because of the magnitude of the territory, the same process
occurs at the regional (i.e., state) and national levels.
However, here we begin to see a growing rift between the citizen and
the office holder. Some of the rift is attributable to the multitude of
citizens and the capacity or incapacity of the office holder to engage in
personal discussion with the citizen. But another element of the rupture
is due to the fragmentation of the society and what I will call the
professionalization of the office holder. By the professionalization of
the office holder I mean that he or she is viewed as the expert not only
in the making of law and its administration, but also in the sense of
being more capable of deciding what the members of society need and
what they do not.
As the important collaborative nature of the bond between citizen and
office holder becomes less evident under these circumstances, the
balance between the intellect and the will is altered. It may be that there
is still a relation between the intellect and the will; however, the
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composition of who supplies the intellect and the will has changed. A
part of this change is attributable to the sizes of the population and the
territory over which the law will apply.
But a part of this
transformation is also attributable to the self-perception that the office
holder knows better than the citizen who is then consigned to the
restricted status of the governed. While the wills of citizens are varied,
can the same be said of the office holder? My point here is that the
office holders will generally have a different set of objectives
constituting their will than those of the citizens: the prime one would be
staying in office. This is a concern for, but probably not an objective of,
the citizen who is interested in societal improvement. Although the
office holder likely has some concern about the welfare of the governed,
the official can easily have a different take on the moral concerns of the
law than would those whose lives are guided and regulated by the laws
which are made.
Of course, both citizens and office holders can be divided by
disagreement concerning the objectives of the law. However, the
citizens will usually experience the law’s impact more quickly than the
office holders who may well excuse themselves from the law’s ambit.
If you doubt my contention, you might inventory the laws made by
Congress in which it often excuses itself from the law’s application.16
Some citizens may well get what they want in a newly enacted law, but
other citizens will probably not be so fortunate—probably because their
lobbying efforts were less effective. However, the office holder who
makes the law has the final say in crafting the language that will
become the norm. This is where the distinction between the “is” and
the “ought” of the law becomes all the more important.
Whatever laws are made, their content is the law’s being; the content
becomes the “is.” But there would be little guarantee that the laws that
are promulgated are what is needed by the society for its general
welfare, its domestic tranquility, its mutual defense, and its enjoyment
of true justice. If I may borrow from Thomas Aquinas’s first principle
of the law (seeking the good and avoiding the evil)17 and ask a question:
has the pursuit of doing what is essential for the common good been
compromised by the accommodation of special interests? If this is the
case, the balance between the discerning and objective intellect and the
satisfaction of a proper will has been disturbed. If I may borrow again
16. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distrust: The
Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State Constitutional Amendment by Initiative
Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 3, 18 n.55 (1992) (including a catalogue of self-granted
Congressional exemptions).
17. AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 2, at 221–22.
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from my fellow Jesuit Viktor Cathrein, the natural moral law (which he
defines as “the light of reason inherent in us by nature, through which
we perceive what we ought to do and avoid”18) has been discounted. It
may also be that the process of defining the ought has been transformed
insofar as determining what ought to be done now takes more stock of
self-preservation than attainment of the common good.
What is the response to this predicament regarding the “ought”? In
the final analysis, the “ought” offers a path to securing the common
good. Here I must emphasize the role of the “moral” in the concept of
the natural moral law since what is moral pertains to the common good.
What is moral and what is not must acknowledge the importance and
the primacy of the common good. Both the intellect and the will have
crucial roles to play in its attainment. The intellect by speculative
reason can identify and weigh the merits or lack thereof of the content
of the norms to be promulgated that advance the common good. The
intellect is the means of evaluating the “is” and the “ought.” The will,
on the other hand, exercises the determination to ensure that what has
been defined by the superior intellect as the “ought” will be attained.
To assist this important project, which is vital to the project of
democracy, is, as Heinrich Rommen explained it, the identification of
material content of the human (positive) law that will advance the
common good from the “rational, free, and social” nature of man.19
This human or positive law should to be the product of the natural
law if the primacy of the common good is to be respected and protected.
Without this lifeline, the law will be whatever the law-maker wants, and
as history has amply demonstrated, this can be most problematic. The
nobility of the law is put into serious risk if it is the product of
positivism where the will escapes from its vital link to the intellect and
makes whatever law the law-maker wants without any further
consideration of the moral concerns of the law-making enterprise.
Despotic forms of governance throughout much of recent human history
have justified their reigns not solely by brute force, but by brute force
that is justified by the law of positivism. As Rommen reminds us in his
monumental work on the nature of the state, the dictators of the modern
age were “masters of legality” and used the law, as Hitler did, to come
to power by the democratic process of majority vote.20 The antidote to
this inevitably disastrous approach has its source in the Book of
18. See ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 6, at 181–82 (quoting VIKTOR CATHERIN,
S.J., 2 MORALPHILOSOPHIE 344 (4th ed. 1904)).
19. Id. at 186.
20. HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 212–13 (1945) [hereinafter
ROMMEN, CATHOLIC THOUGHT].
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Wisdom: love justice, you who are rulers of the earth.21 But how does
one know what justice is?
Once again, the combination of the intellect and the will supply an
answer which resides in the nature of the human person who is both
intelligent and virtuous. If the intellect and the will are the common
heritage of the members of the human family, so is virtue. The
elements of virtue, particularly the cardinal virtues (courage, justice,
forbearance/temperance, and prudence/wisdom), are the building blocks
upon which the objective intellect and the healthy will are established
and exercised. It is this human edifice where the natural moral law
claims its home: the human person whose will and intellect founded
upon virtue will make norms that are just, prudent and wise, temperate,
and courageous because this person’s existence is established on these
qualities.
II.
This brings me to the sub-heading of today’s lecture: the role of
citizenship in defining the nature of the law. Some may think of the law
as commands; others may think of the law as duties; still others may
think it a body of rights and protections to these claims. But the law’s
final cause or objective is the means by which people justly live their
individual lives in common with their neighbors, whoever they may be.
The essence of the law is geared to right relationship in this common
life, and this truth about the law introduces the essential subject of
citizenship. Liberty that is ordered by the law is the fashion in which it
is embraced by the citizen and office holder alike, for both know what
the law is and also what it ought to be when the common good is at
stake. Each member of these two classes inhabits the res publica and
shares the common denominator as a member of the society. It is their
common rational being that helps them sort out what is essential to
ordering human liberty by means of the law. In the final analysis,
Rommen’s definition of the law is appropriate here: the law is a
“general rule of reason which is directed to the common good, emanates
from public authority, and is duly promulgated.”22 It takes an authentic
freedom to recognize this, and each person by his or her reason can
comprehend the distinction between the authentic freedom that is
essential to the law and unrestrained license.
In the context of Rommen’s definition of the law, attention needs to
be placed on the public authority for this is the intersection of the
21. Wisdom 1:1–3.
22. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 6, at 195.
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responsibilities of the citizen and of the office holder. In our federal
republic, the office holder comes from the citizenry; moreover, the
office holder exercises a trust on behalf of the citizenry. It is the
prudence/wisdom, courage, temperance/forbearance, and justice of the
citizen and the office holder who, by the exercise of the intellect and
reason, can see that the law is the means by which the common good is
achieved and sustained. If the law is an act of reason, it is right reason
that is formed by the virtues that make any person—as citizen or as
office holder—recognize that the law is, first and last, the means by
which the common good is the objective of the just society. The law
will ultimately fail if it is about preserving the position of a particular
person or group; however, it will succeed if it is directed to achieving
the common good which takes into account the life, liberty, and pursuit
of happiness of everyone. As Thomas Aquinas reminds us, it is this
pursuit of what is good, what is just that “directs man in his relations”
with others.23
For the citizen who may become office holder and who then has a
particular role in the formulation of the human law, the ability to know
what is good and what is just is dependent on his or her intellectual and
moral formation. An essential part of this formation is to understand
that the human person lives in relationship with everyone else. This
element of authentic human formation, moreover, alerts each person to
the fact that while he or she has rights (rights that emerge not from the
state but from their innate and inviolable dignity as a human being),
everyone, by the exercise of objective reason, must simultaneously
acknowledge that everyone else must have the same capacity to the
same or similar claims. In short, this critical formation pairs right with
responsibility.
It is the practice of virtue that enables the person to understand and
acknowledge the synthesis of right and responsibility in one’s personal
life as it is lived in community—in relation—with others. This point is
the foundation of what can be termed the essential element of justice
that is founded on the natural moral law: the suum cuique, to each his or
her own. Of course, what is due each member of the human family
cannot be fully and finally determined until the due of others with
whom this person is in relation is considered. With recognition of the
suum cuique comes the application of norms that are conscious of the
twinning of right and responsibility. The virtuous person has the
capacity to know this by the exercise of courage, prudence/wisdom,
23. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON LAW & JUSTICE: EXCERPTS FROM SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. IIII, q. 58, art. 5, at 1437–38 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
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justice, and forbearance/temperance. No one can properly claim a right
without acknowledging the responsibilities that attend the right.
It has been said that virtue directs the acts of the human person
toward the common good.24 With the virtuous person directing the
formulation and application of the human law, the natural moral law is
observed. It has been said that an evil law is no law at all.25 One need
not think too long or hard to realize the truth of this claim. Surely in
recent times, the despotic, totalitarian states of the world have brought
hardship, suffering, and annihilation to tens of millions of human
subjects. Therefore it is crucial to remember that for the most part these
states did what they did not in the absence of law but with its evil
surrogate in the form of a destructive positivist law. These were legal
systems with laws based not on objective reason and moral
consideration but, rather, on an intensified will that takes account of the
interests of the controlling party (e.g., National Socialist, Communist,
Fascist) and little or nothing else.
The natural moral law is founded on the premise of the common
good. The positivist law is founded on other suppositions, which find a
home in Supreme Court decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sanford26 and
Buck v. Bell.27 I hasten to add that this is not a comprehensive but only
illustrative list. Positivist law can also be found in legislation such as
those examples already mentioned, e.g., the Fugitive Slave Act and the
Nuremberg Laws. To recall the Hart and Fuller engagement of the
1950s and 1960s (their debating whether there is a separation between
law and morality),28 the virtuous person recognizes that the law, when
true to its vocation, is a moral enterprise. As Rommen contended, “law
and morality are not separated.”29 While some laws may be facially
neutral regarding moral concerns, (for example: making a law to
regulate on which side of the street motorists drive), there is often a

24. JEAN-YVES CALVES & JAQUES PERRIN, THE CHURCH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL
TEACHINGS OF THE POPES FROM LEO XIII TO PIUS XII 148 (J.R. Kirwan trans., 1961) (referring
to a letter from Cardinal Gasparri, the Secretary of State, to M. Duthoit, the President of the
Semaines Sociales in 1928).
25. AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I-II, q. 96, art. 4, at 233.
26. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
27. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
28. Compare H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958) (defending the Positivist school of jurisprudence), with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) (criticizing
Professor Hart’s thesis as essentially incomplete, in part, because it ignores the internal “morality
of order” that is necessary to create law).
29. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 6, at 212.
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moral concern originating within their underlying intent (e.g., regulating
motorist conduct in order to protect them, their passengers, and other
users of public ways). With the exception of private bills that become
law through the legislative process, virtually all law that is legislated is
done so for reasons that have some grounding in moral implications.
Thus, laws made by human institutions, which ignore or contradict
moral considerations are suspect. Laws that are immoral are all the
more dubious. For law to be legitimate it must be directed to the
common good; thus, it requires a moral foundation.30 If the task of the
law, then, is to combat or at least avoid that which is evil in society and
to seek and preserve that which is good (specifically the common good),
there is a need for the freedom for the citizenry and the public officials
to recognize and do what is necessary to secure this objective. This
freedom is not a negative one, i.e., freedom from; rather, it is a positive
freedom for. But some exercises of freedom can have an imbalanced
appetite that directs disproportional energy to acquiring or achieving
objectives that are incompatible with the common good. Moreover,
some notions of freedom and liberty are problematic as they can set the
claims of individuals in diametrical opposition to one another. One
major illustration of this is the dicta from Planned Parenthood v. Casey
in which the plurality opinion asserts that, “At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”31 This is not a
recommended method for achieving the common good through the
juridical mechanisms of society; rather it is a recipe for anarchy. While
their objective was likely something else, the Supreme Court plurality
did not recognize that this formulation sets conflicting views of liberty
on a collision course without providing a means for preventing the
confrontation. However, the natural moral law proposes a different
course.
With the foreknowledge that the law is a moral enterprise, the natural
moral law acknowledges the importance and vitality of liberty;
however, it also recognizes that liberty, if it is true to its vocation, must
be ordered by always taking account of liberty’s complementary
responsibilities. And the likely agent for fashioning the order of liberty
is the natural moral law and its objective of achieving and sustaining the
common good. When the law is true to its nature, it has the capacity to
order properly the liberty of persons, not to curtail a natural right which
they have, but to ensure that it remains authentic and robust for all
30. Id. at 213 (“All law requires a moral foundation.”).
31. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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rather than some members of society. The nature of the law, as I have
explained it, has the antidote and counterpoint to the fallacy about
liberty presented by the dicta of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
It is this nature of the law that ensures the freedoms we all desire are
sought by a properly formed will. This regulatory and protective
function of the nature of the law is an exercise of the objective reason
upon which the human intellect relies. This reliance, furthermore,
accentuates human consciousness and the rational process so that the
claiming of rights for me is never divorced from simultaneous
responsibilities to thee. Resident within these processes, then, is the
guarantor that the common good will not be undermined but will be
promoted and protected.
As I have reminded past audiences in this lecture series,32 we are all
citizens of two cities: the City of God and the City of Man. Today I
concentrate on the second citizenship just mentioned. For within this
citizenship—which is a natural right—there is also a natural duty. This
natural duty contains the obligation to ensure that the law seeks the
common good rather than iniquity. The citizens of the City of Man are
not inert bystanders who must remain by the sidelines when the office
holder takes the law into the direction of positivism and away from the
common good that is built on the natural moral law. The citizens are
and must remain active participants in securing the common good as
their authentic individual good is inextricably related and
complementary to the common good. Here we are reminded of an
important thought often attributed to Edmund Burke: “All that is
necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”33
Regardless of the source of this counsel, its posture and substantive
content ring true. Democracy and the rule of law that undergirds it are
not easy tasks to build and sustain; they are hard work and require the
participation of people of good will who know and exercise their rights
and responsibilities in a manner that reinforces the quest for the
common good. That is why the citizens interested in the existence and
support of democracy and the rule of law realize that they must make
their own contribution to the law’s sustenance. To follow the Burkean
admonition, they must do something so that evil will not triumph. In a
32. See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, S.J., Inaugural Lecture of the John Courtney Murray Chair:
John Courtney Murray S.J.: A Citizen of Two Cities (April 27, 2010), in 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. i, ii
(2010).
33. See EDMUND BURKE, THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF PRESENT DISCONTENTS (1770),
reprinted in 1 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 69, 146 (Liberty Fund ed., 1999) (“When bad
men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a
contemptible struggle.”).
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similar fashion, we must consider why doing something is critical to the
law and its nature and the common good that they support. Heinrich
Rommen’s fellow German, the Lutheran pastor Martin Niemöller,
supplies further thought on this. Like Rommen, he was arrested by the
Nazis but also escaped execution. After the Second World War,
Niemöller would often discuss what happened in his beloved Germany
by saying that: the Nazis first came for the socialists and communists,
but he did not speak out because he was not one of them; then they
came for the trade unionists and the Jews, but again he did nothing
because he was neither of them; finally, when they came for him, “no
one was left to speak for me.”34 As I have stated, democracy, the rule
of law, and sustaining the nature of the law involve commitment,
diligence, and effort. If nothing is done, as Pastor Niemöller asserted,
the darkness that can envelope the world will prevail—at least for a
while. And during that time, much that is good (including the common
good) can be lost.
With conscious and concerted effort by the virtuous person and
citizen, what is at stake, i.e., the common good, will not be forgotten or
compromised. The virtuous citizen, like the virtuous office holder
(would that we have more!), possesses the capacity to exercise the
freedom needed to memorialize and practice what is essential to the
law’s nature. It is the law’s nature that directs the society where this
nature’s authenticity is cherished by sustaining the environment for
seeking and keeping the common good. Each person possesses an
inclination toward the common good. This precious disposition can be
compromised, but it cannot be removed from the objective reason of the
person by the state even though its practice can be inhibited by the state.
So, the virtuous citizen ought not to neglect the freedom to do what is
necessary for the common good. Freedom that is pursued for whatever
the individual self desires is an exercise of the will detached from the
intellect. Moreover, it is a liberty that is disordered rather than ordered.
And when disordered liberty is at bay, we will come to know their
distortion of freedom by another of its names: chaos.
Let us not forget, then, that it is the nature of the law to see that this
disarray remains at bay! We can do something in this regard if we are
true to the vocation of virtuous citizenship by nurturing a society whose
lodestar is the natural moral law.

34. See Harold Marcuse, Martin Niemöller’s Famous Quotation: “First They Came for the
Communists . . .”, U. CAL., SANTA BARBARA, DEPARTMENT HIST. (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/niem.htm (explaining the Martin Neimöller position
regarding the piecemeal erosion of the prerogatives of citizens by the National Socialist Party).
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